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Statutory right to rescind contract remained available to buyer subject to 
specific performance decree. 
 
The aftermath of the Queensland floods of January 2011 continues to be played out 
in the courts.  The effect of the floods on such a large scale has awakened the use of 
some statutory provisions that have not previously been litigated .Section 64 of 
the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) is such a section.  A version of this provision 
appears as s 34 of the Sale of Land Act 1982 (Vic).  Broadly speaking, these 
sections permit a buyer of a dwelling house which has been damaged or destroyed 
between contract and completion to rescind the contract and recover their deposit 
provided that the rescission notice is given prior to "the date of completion or 
possession".  The  Court of Appeal decision of Dunworth v Mirvac Queensland Pty 
Ltd [2011] QCA 200 appears to be the first litigation upon the application of the 
section since it came into force in 1975. 
  
Relevant facts   
 
 In July 2007, a buyer contracted to buy an apartment off the plan in riverside 
residential apartment development at Tennyson, Brisbane.  Settlement was due on 
12 May 2009 with time of the essence.  On 11 May 2009, the buyer purported to 
terminate the contract and brought proceedings against the seller claiming her 
contract should be declared void for misleading or deceptive conduct (connected 
with the height of the apartment above the existing development site and related 
matters).  On 10 December 2010, the buyer’s claim was dismissed and an order was 
made for specific performance, requiring completion of the contract on 8 February 
2011.  
 
On 13 January 2011, the apartment in question was substantially damaged in the 
Brisbane floods and rendered unfit for occupation.  Accordingly, on 28 January 2011, 
the buyer purported to exercise her right to rescind under s 64 of the Property Law 
Act 1974 upon the basis that the apartment still remained, on 28 January 2011, unfit 
for occupation as a dwelling house.  The seller alleged that the time for exercise of 
the right had passed after 12 May 2009. 
  
The  seller’s arguments 
All parties conceded that the apartment remained “unfit for occupation as a dwelling” 
as at the date of the purported rescission. The question was whether the buyer, who 
remained in default, and whose contract was subject to an unsatisfied order for 
specific performance, could terminate under s 64. 
The seller argued firstly, that if the buyer could terminate under s64, the buyer was 
benefiting from her own wrong-doing (that is, she failed to settle on the original due 
date, and, as a result had the additional benefit of s64 which would not have been 
available at that date as the damage had not occurred).  Secondly, the seller argued 
that the right to terminate could only have been exercised before the contractually 
appointed date for completion ie 12 May 2009 and that it was out of time.  Thirdly, 
the seller argued that a buyer with some knowledge of possible  future severe 
adverse weather conditions could deliberately and wilfully breach the contract and 
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act upon the chance that a court would order specific performance of the contract 
and thereby gain a right of rescission if the date for completion was thereby 
extended.  The Court referred to this as “an extreme possibility” (at [35]) upon which 
the construction of the statute could not grounded. 
The judgment 
In dismissing all of these arguments, de Jersey CJ (with whom Phillip McMurdo and 
Dalton JJ agreed) found that the “date of completion” meant the actual date of 
completion not the date “for completion” initially set out in the contract.  As the 
contract was still on foot due to the specific performance order (at [39],[49],[50]),it 
could be rescinded at any time until actual completion occurred regardless of the fact 
that it was subject to specific performance decree due to the buyer’s default. 
Interestingly, in dictum, it was noted that s64, unlike s34 of the Sale of Land Act 
1982 (Vic), gives no right to the seller to maintain the contract in order to attempt to 
repair the damage. The possibility of restoration does not preclude rescission where 
the “premise has been met” ie where the dwelling is unfit for occupation as at the 
date of rescission (at [39]).The Court did not need to explore this further but the 
answer would lie in determining whether the property was “unfit of occupation as a 
dwelling house” rather then merely requiring to be “cleaned up” after an event which 
caused the damage.(see, Georgeson v Palmos (1962) 106 CLR 578) 
Conclusion 
The particular circumstances of the case are most unusual, with a defaulting buyer 
obtaining the benefit of an untrammelled statutory right to rescind because of an 
intervening natural disaster.  However, it does emphasise the importance of 
developers considering whether they should pursue an application for a specific 
performance of a contract, or terminate a contract and sue for loss or damage.  In 
this case, if the seller had terminated the contract and forfeited the deposit, it would 
have been entitled to claim a loss on resale (after repairing the apartment).  
However, as the court also conceded, the prospect of such damage occurring to 
effectively prevent a specific performance order being satisfied was, at best, “an 
extreme possibility”.  As the court said, the consequences of the buyer’s default had 
already been visited upon the buyer by the award of a decree for specific 
performance against her, and as the subsequent damage to the property was 
outside her control (at [40],[52], her rights to rescind fell  squarely within those given 
by s 64. 
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